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a notE on KriPKEnstEin’s Paradox
Una nota sobre la Paradoja de KriPKenstein
Gustavo Picazo
aBstraCt
In this note I present a solution to Kripkenstein’s paradox, based on a very simple 
argument: (1) natural language and rule-following are empirical phenomena; (2) no 
case has been described, in real life, of  a person who behaves as Wittgenstein’s or 
Kripke’s fictional character; (3) therefore, the discussion of  such a case is completely 
devoid of  interest. I lay out the example of  a ‘Kripkensteinian apple’, which has a 
normal weight on even days and is weightless on odd days, in order to highlight the 
contrast between a genuinely empirical perspective, such as that of  physics, and the 
logical-analytical perspective, under which Kripkenstein’s paradox has attracted so 
much attention.
KEyWords: Communication; empirical semantics; logical analysis; Ludwig 
Wittgenstein; Saul Kripke.
rEsuMEn
En esta nota presento una solución a la paradoja de Kripkenstein, basada en un 
argumento sumamente sencillo: (1) el lenguaje natural y el seguimiento de reglas son 
fenómenos empíricos; (2) no se ha descrito en la vida real ningún caso similar a los 
personajes ficticios de Wittgenstein y Kripke; (3) por consiguiente, la discusión de 
un caso semejante carece completamente de interés. Propongo el ejemplo de una 
“manzana kripkensteiniana”, ingrávida los días impares del mes y grávida los pares, 
para que se vea mejor el contraste entre una perspectiva genuinamente empírica, como 
la de la física, y la perspectiva lógico-analítica, que ha llevado a dedicar a la paradoja 
de Kripkenstein tanta atención.
PaLaBras CLavE: Análisis lógico; comunicación; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Saul 
Kripke; semántica empírica.
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1. In this note I present a new approach to Kripkenstein’s paradox.1 This 
paradox is based on a fictional character; neither Wittgenstein nor Kripke derives 
the paradox from a real case, but from an imaginary one:
Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2) beyond 1000—and he writes 
1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.
We say to him: “Look what you’ve done”—He doesn’t understand. We say: “You 
were meant to add two: look how you began the series!”—He answers: “Yes, isn’t 
it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it” (Wittgenstein 1958, I, §185);2
This was our paradox: no course of  action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of  action can be made out to accord with the rule (Wittgenstein 1958, I, §201);
I do not in this piece of  writing attempt to speak for myself, or, except in occasional 
and minor asides, to say anything about my own views on the substantive issues … 
Primarily I can be read, except in a few obvious asides, as almost like an attorney 
presenting a major philosophical argument as it struck me (Kripke 1982, p. ix);
Let me suppose, for example, that ‘68 + 57’ is a computation that I have never 
performed before … I perform the computation, obtaining, of  course, the answer 
‘125’ … Now suppose I encounter a bizarre sceptic. This sceptic questions my 
certainty about my answer, in what I just called the ‘metalinguistic’ sense. Perhaps, 
he suggests, as I used the term ‘plus’ in the past, the answer I intended for ‘68 
+ 57’ should have been ‘5’! … Ridiculous and fantastic though it is, the sceptic’s 
hypothesis is not logically impossible (Kripke 1982, pp. 8-9).
The paradox arises, hence, from a thought experiment: from the logical 
analysis of  a hypothetical scenario. Neither in Wittgenstein’s nor in Kripke’s 
writings – nor, as far as I have been able to check, in any later publication on this 
paradox – is there a single real case of  a subject who behaves as the rebel pupil 
or the bizarre sceptic that Wittgenstein and Kripke portray in these quotations.3
1 “I refer, of  course, to the paradox that Saul Kripke … has located in the work of  Wittgenstein” 
(Schiffer 1986, p. 162, note 9). Given that this paradox has been so vastly debated, it is difficult 
to verify that the approach I present here is completely new. However, I have revised more 
than one hundred publications (including virtually all those archived in http://philpapers.org 
under the category ‘Kripkenstein on Meaning’ at the time of  writing this paper), and none of  
them gives an argument similar to the one I put forward here. Towards the end of  the paper, 
I will mention the two references I have found that come closest.
2 Italics are as in the original, unless otherwise stated.
3 Of  course, the case of  someone who has not yet mastered the rule and is unsure about how 
to apply it, the case of  someone who has full competence in applying the rule but disputes it 
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On the other hand, it is an increasingly accepted thesis that natural language 
and natural language rules are not mental realities, or Platonic self-subsistent 
entities, but social phenomena, which exist in virtue of  how people behave in 
society. In other words: that without people, and without people behaving in a 
certain way, there is no natural language, and there is no rule-following at all (in the 
sense of  natural language rule-following). If  this is so, language and rule-following 
are empirical phenomena, and they must be studied from an empirical perspective, 
not from a logical one. Kripkenstein’s paradox amounts then to speculation on 
a purely hypothetical case, one which in the real world is not known to happen, 
and that there is no reason to think is ever going to happen. How speculation 
on such a case may be of  interest for science, philosophy, or any other area of  
human knowledge, is hard to see. Such is my solution to Kripkenstein’s paradox, 
a solution that can be summed up as follows:
Premise 1: Natural language and rule-following are empirical (social) 
phenomena.
Premise 2: No one has reported a real-life case of  someone who behaves 
like Wittgenstein’s or Kripke’s fictional character, nor has it been 
plausibly argued that such a person exists or will exist in the future.
Conclusion: Speculation on such a case is completely devoid of  interest.
2. Kripkenstein’s argument is especially pressing for the Platonic conception of  
meaning, according to which meanings and social rules are self-subsistent entities, 
which we manage to grasp by some mysterious procedure yet to be clarified. From 
this – logical-introspective – point of  view, the possibility of  someone failing 
to grasp ‘the correct meanings’, including myself  or the whole community of  
speakers, as well as the possibility that the observable evidence is not enough to 
univocally determine what those meanings are, are worrisome. However, from 
an empirical point of  view, and in particular from the view of  meaning and rule-
following as genuine social phenomena, the situation is exactly the opposite: it is 
precisely because there are no rebels or bizarre sceptics of  the kind described by 
with the aim of  enforcing a new one, or the case of  someone who is just cynically pretending 
not to understand, do not qualify as instances of  Kripkenstein’s scepticism. These cases are 
indeed easy to find, but they do not exhibit the kind of  radical disagreement that gives rise to 
the paradox, and have played no significant role in the literature on the subject.
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Wittgenstein and Kripke, that social rules emerge – that social rules come into 
existence.
In order to illustrate the difference between the empirical and the logical-
introspective approach, let us place the discussion in a field whose empirical 
character is beyond any doubt: physics. Let us imagine that someone proposes to 
discuss the case of  a ‘Kripkensteinian apple’: an apple which is attracted to the 
Earth on the even days of  the month, but not on odd days; in such a way that on 
even days it falls to the ground when we drop it, but on odd days it remains free-
floating, as a cloud. What a great problem such an apple would pose for physics! 
The laws of  mechanics would be fatally challenged by a case like this. And yet it is 
difficult to imagine the physicists entangled for a long time on the discussion of  
such a case: the purported apple simply does not exist, and the only lesson that 
can be obtained from it is that its nonexistence confirms those physical laws with 
which it would be incompatible.
In the case of  Kripkenstein’s paradox, there is an analogous lesson to be 
learned: that instead of  requiring of  a good semantic theory that it enables us to 
tame the Kripkensteinian imaginary rebel, the sensible thing to do is to use the 
fact that there are no Kripkensteinian rebels as evidence in favour of  those semantic 
theories which have as a consequence that Kripkensteinian rebels do not occur4. 
4 Gary Ebbs has pointed out that: “If  we have no understanding of  rules apart from our 
practices of  obeying rules and going against them in actual cases, then we can’t make sense 
of  Kripke’s skeptical ‘hypothesis’ that in the past our word ‘plus’ meant quus not plus. Kripke 
tries to persuade us that we can make sense of  this ‘hypothesis’ by focusing on our first-person 
experience of  trying to follow a rule. This directs our attention to mental states that accompany 
our attempts to follow rules, and thereby leads us unwittingly to accept Kripke’s view that a 
speaker’s intention to follow a rule is just a matter of  his being in a certain mental state 
… Without Kripke’s view of  meaning to sustain it, our feeling that we understand Kripke’s 
skeptical ‘hypothesis’ fades. And without Kripke’s skeptical ‘hypothesis’ to motivate it, his 
skepticism about meaning dissolves. Since the skeptic has not raised a genuine possibility, there 
is no need to try to rule it out” (Ebbs 1997, §130). However, the possibility to which Kripke 
initially alludes is precisely that of  a ‘bizarre sceptic’ appearing that raises such a hypothesis. 
Leaving aside whether the hypothesis that the sceptic purports is something of  which we can 
make sense, the very fact that no such sceptic ever appears in real life is something that Ebbs 
could have crucially used to reinforce his position at this point.
On the other hand, Andrew Lewis contemplates the possibility of  such a sceptic appearing, 
but he notes: “If  only one person began to respond to ‘+2’ as the pupil does, we could 
simply dismiss it as ‘a hitherto unknown kind of  insanity’ [in reference to a quote to (Frege 
2013) given in (Wittgenstein 1978, §152)]. However, if  his case was repeated in sufficiently 
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And there is yet a second – more bottom-line – lesson to be learned from this 
paradox, and from the vast discussion it has brought about: that logical analysis is 
not the best methodology for addressing the semantic study of  natural language. 
Indeed, the very philosophical entanglement to which the logical-introspective 
perspective has driven us in this case is an a fortiori reason to opt for an empirical 
model of  meaning, such as the one I have argued for elsewhere.5 Only then will 
we realise how fruitless it is to cast so much attention on a case that never occurs, 
instead of  investigating the inner workings of  natural language by looking at real 
communicative transactions.
3. Appendix. An anonymous referee of  Análisis objects that ‘what Kripke’s 
argument shows is that the solutions to the new questions are not determined by 
the solutions previously given to old questions’, so that ‘confining the discussion 
to Kripke’s example does not do justice to the argument’. I think it is worthwhile 
answering this criticism, and I will try to do so in this appendix.
To start with, it should be noticed that the way in which Kripke’s argument is 
supposed to show that ‘the solutions to the new questions are not determined by 
the solutions previously given to old questions’ is by means of  the hypothetical 
case of  a certain sceptic – the case of  an sceptic to whom, should she appear on 
stage, we would not know how to reply. And the fact that we cannot convince 
the sceptic that her answers are incorrect (that is, the fact that we cannot logically 
demonstrate that her answers are incorrect, on the basis of  the preceding 
solutions) is supposed to prove that the solutions to the new questions are not in 
fact determined by the solutions already given to old questions.
The preceding reasoning is an example of  a purely conceptual (purely logico-
philosophical) reasoning. It begins with an imaginary scenario, and reaches a 
certain conclusion after a number of  steps. But let us imagine, however, that the 
great numbers, then, unless it was possible either to re-train or to isolate those who respond 
in this way, it would become impossible to continue the communal practice of  arithmetic. 
Wittgenstein therefore views this case as a danger only if  it becomes actual, and only if  it 
occurs with sufficient frequency; however, the rule-sceptic regards even the possibility of  such 
a case as a threat to arithmetic” (Lewis 1988, p. 297). What Lewis does not realise is that, again, 
the very fact that in real life no Kripkensteinian sceptics ever appear (not even once, let alone 
‘in sufficiently great numbers’) is in itself  evidence in favour of  the social vision of  language: 
the way in which subjects manage to harmonise their answers as a matter of  fact is by the mere 
practice of  living in community, not by looking for justifications.
5 (Picazo 2014), (Picazo 2015a), (Picazo 2015b).
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solutions to the new questions are not determined by logic, but by a complex 
empirical mechanism. My hunger, for example, is not determined by logic, but 
by an empirical mechanism, which has to do with my biological constitution. The 
mechanism by virtue of  which I feel hungry after some time without eating is 
independent of  whether I can be convinced by rational reasoning that I should 
feel hungry after not having eaten for some time.
Let us suppose, then, that there is an analogous mechanism responsible for 
the fact that people coincide in their answers to rule-following questions (in the 
usual conditions, i.e., supposing that there is a linguistic community, a previous 
well-defined use, etc.). Assuming that this mechanism exists, the fact that people 
coincide in their answers to rule-following questions could be seen, not as the 
consequence of  logical reasoning, but as a consequence of  the action of  that 
mechanism.
Such is precisely the thesis I hold. By maintaining that natural language and 
rule-following are empirical phenomena, I am committed to the existence of  a 
complex mechanism (which I am not, obviously, in a position to account for in 
detail), by virtue of  which understanding and linguistic communication exist. By 
virtue of  such mechanism, answers to the new questions are determined; but they 
are not logically determined by the answers to the old questions; rather, they are 
empirically determined by the mechanism which regulates the very existence of  
language as a whole.
From this perspective, the fact that we actually coincide in our answers, and 
the fact that Kripkenstein’s sceptics do not crop up in real life, are regarded as 
relevant evidence. Indeed, they are regarded as evidence in favour of  the bottom-
line hypothesis that there is an empirical mechanism responsible for the existence 
of  natural language. In this respect, the claim that ‘confining the discussion to 
Kripke’s example does not do justice to the argument’ is precisely an instance 
of  the type of  mistake that I contend against here: the whole of  Kripkenstein’s 
argument is based on a fictional character, and the way to do justice to the argument 
is precisely to point out that, as long as a person who behaves like that fictional 
character is not found in real life, there is simply no case; just as there is no case to 
be raised in physics regarding the Kripkensteinian apple, simply because such an 
apple does not exist. It is true that, were there to be Kripkensteinian apples, their 
existence would challenge the laws of  physics. But for that same reason, the fact 
that there are no Kripkensteinian apples is a confirmation of  such laws. And in 
a similar way, it is true that if  there were Kripkensteinian sceptics, their existence 
would challenge the existence of  a shared language. But for that same reason, the 
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fact that there are no Kripkensteinian sceptics must be regarded as a confirmation 
that natural language communication exists.6
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